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Abstract 
This article explores how Arctic policy is presented in Russian political narratives. This is 
achieved through the discourse analysis of 109 official documents published within seven-year 
timeframe (2008-2015) on the official website of the Russian President. The article argues that 
Russian leaders emphasise the state’s geographical location and significant contribution to 
historical exploration and environmental protection of the region to frame Russia as an ‘Arctic 
Great Power’ which has natural rights to possess and utilise the Arctic’s abundant resources. 
The logic of ‘our Arctic, our rules’ can justify any necessary sacrifices, and the assertive policy 
of the state. However, this discursive representation of the Russian Arctic does not correlate 
with the reality of the country’s current interests in international cooperation and its willingness 
to ‘play by the rules’.  
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Introduction  
The Arctic region has been branded by the media as ‘Ali Baba’s cave’ due to the abundance of 
its natural resources. Consequently, there is no shortage of contenders seeking control over the 
Arctic’s treasures. The Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf deals with the 
competing continental shelf claims from a number of circumpolar states. The governments of 
the ‘Arctic 5’ (Canada, Norway, Denmark (Greenland), the United States, and Russia) are 
increasingly competing in the Great Arctic Game.  
In geographical terms, Russia is the biggest Arctic state: one third of its territory falls 
above the Arctic Circle and Russia hopes to further expand its presence in the Arctic region. In 
December 2001, it submitted a continental shelf claim to the United Nations (Baev, 2010: 6), 
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but this was returned on the grounds that the UN required more evidence. In March 2014, a 
UN maritime commission confirmed Russia’s right to the possession of 52,000 square km in 
the Okhotsk Sea.1 If all outstanding territorial disputes were to be settled in Russia’s favour, 
the country would acquire 45% of the Arctic’s territory (Kefferputz, 2010). However, despite 
being the largest Arctic state, Russia is ‘yet to become an Arctic nation’ (Medby, 2014: 253).  
The Russian Arctic is sparsely populated, and the majority of the Russian population 
do not necessarily have a sense of belonging to the Arctic. Thus, an identity-building process 
is a key part of the ‘Great Arctic Game’: competition over the hearts and minds of national and 
international audiences. Russian leaders need to create a narrative explaining the significance 
of the Arctic to the national audience. At the international level, Russia presents itself as a key 
actor in the region, but at the same time it lacks the necessary economic means to fulfil its 
national ambitions. Therefore, Russia needs to be careful in defining its place in relation to the 
remaining Arctic states (the ‘Other’) in order to ensure that its voice is heard and considered 
during the Artic race and that invaluable economic and technical collaborations are secured.  
This article explores how in the context of the increased importance of the region, 
Russian leaders use rhetorical means to legitimise the country’s natural right to develop the 
Arctic, providing a justification for Russian policies in the region for the national and 
international audiences. The article explores the link between identity and policy, and 
contributes to the existing discussion on the interdependence between identity-building and 
Arctic politics (see: Dodds, 2011; Medby, 2014; Williams, 2011). To achieve this aim, it 
employs a discourse analysis of 109 documents published on the Russian President’s official 
website (www.kremlin.ru) within the 2008-2015 timeframe. The discourse analysis is 
supported by detailed study of relevant laws and decrees as well as media articles and 
secondary sources. The article argues that whilst for the national audience the official narrative 
emphasises the strong historical connection with the region (which is supported by references 
to the popular idea of Russia as a ‘Great Power’); for the international audience Russia is forced 
to stay within the discursive realm of diplomacy, where international cooperation will bring 
more tangible benefits to the region (due to the existing lack of economic and military 
capabilities) than a policy of open hostility and isolation.    
 Identity and Russia’s Arctic policy  
                                                          
1 Other territorial requests (which include the extensive territory from Russia’s acknowledged 
Arctic territories and up to the North Pole) still need further consideration and investigation. 
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Governments of the Arctic states in their competition to claim control over the resource-rich 
region often resort to identity-building policies to gain support among national and 
international communities (Medby 2014). Identity is a complex and multidimensional concept, 
and can mean different things in social science or in popular discourse (Dittmer and Dodds 
2008). For this study, identity is understood as ‘the self-conception of communities and of 
individuals identifying themselves as members of the community’ (Buzan et al 1998: 119). 
This approach helps us to understand not only how one defines one’s belonging to a certain 
group, but also the parameters of the exclusion of the ‘others’ (the out-group) and relations 
between the ‘others’ and the members of the community (the in-group) (Evans, 2015; Fierke, 
2007).   
Benwell and Stokoe (2006: 130) state that ‘we live in the storytelling society’ and ‘it is 
in narrative that we construct identities’. Thus, narrators use discursive and symbolic means to 
create a version of reality most suitable to their interests (ibid). The narratives can be produced 
and disseminated by a variety of actors: politicians, intellectuals, and mass media (De Cillia et 
al., 1999). This article focuses on the narrative constructed by the Russian state leaders in the 
texts published on the President's official website over a seven year period.  
The reviewed sample of official texts reveals that the Arctic plays multiple purposes in 
Russian identity-construction. Russian leaders need not only to communicate the ‘uniqueness’ 
of Russia as compared to other Arctic states, but also the significance of the Arctic to the 
national audience. This construction of the ‘Arctic myth’ is not a new phenomenon and for a 
long period of time it occupied a very important place in Soviet culture (McCannon 1998: 9). 
In modern days, the development of Arctic policy has become one of the elements of the re-
defined identity of the post-communist Russia which has been an ongoing struggle for state 
leaders since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Light, 2003; Malinova, 2014).  
What defines the ‘new’ Russia? For example, neither in Imperial Russia nor in the USSR 
had state leaders used ethnicity as a uniting factor (Duncan, 2005). Russia’s historical and 
current ethnic diversity eliminated the option of using ethno-nationalism as an official identity 
construction strategy (ibid). Undoubtedly, the notion of ‘great power’ is one of the invariable 
elements of Russian identity (Tolz, 2001). The ‘great power’ aspirations derive from the 
memories of Russian ‘greatness’ in the past (Imperial Russia; the USSR). Particularly, the 
image of the Soviet superpower’s status is firmly grounded in Russian collective memory 
(Clunan, 2009).  In the 1990s, Russia suffered from the so-called ‘negative identity’, when the 
out-group (the West) did not recognise Russia as a powerful actor – the desired image for the 
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in-group (the Russian population) (Evans, 2015: 401). As a result, all presidents of modern 
Russia tried to establish a ‘positive identity’ for Russia – to re-gain ‘great power’ status. Using 
the language of social identity theory, the three presidents used different strategies of identity 
management: from attempts to adopt Western values to get desired recognition, to the refusal 
to accept Western societies ‘as the source of moral and political standards for Russia’ (Evans, 
2015: 401). Social identity theory defines the former as social mobility, and the latter as social 
creativity (Clunan, 2009: 82). Yeltsin and Medvedev preferred the strategy of social mobility, 
whereas Putin's strategy is more consistent with the ideas of social creativity. Yeltsin focused 
on denouncing the communist past in favour of democratic values (Evans, 2015). Medvedev 
placed emphasis on closer cooperation with the West (ibid). Putin preferred to use history to 
create the narrative of Russian greatness and uniqueness. In this narrative, the West is often 
presented as ‘the other’: trying to undermine Russia’s position internationally, and threatening 
traditional Russian values. These strategies are used on both the macro- and micro-level: for 
Russia in general, and in relation to separate policy areas. This article demonstrates the 
evolution of the official narrative of Russian ‘Arcticness’ between 2008 and 2015: how Russian 
Arctic policy is explained in the context of ongoing competition for the Arctic’s treasures with 
‘the other’ (the other Arctic states).   
Russia and the Arctic: context 
In the last few centuries, the understanding and value of the Arctic underwent a rapid change. 
After appealing to 19th-century explorers in their ‘search for new land and resources’, in the 
20th century, the Arctic was seen as being ‘the shortest distance between two superpowers’ 
(Keskitalo, 2012), making the area a highly militarised and securitised territory (Gorenburg, 
2011). The exploration of the North also became a powerful tool of Stalinist propaganda, 
focusing on the heroism of the Soviet People ‘which conquered one of the world’s most 
extreme natural environments’ (Laruelle, 2014: 27, see also Josephson 2014, McCannon 1998). 
Whilst holding a significant strategic role during the Soviet era (Lakhtine, 1930; Zenzinov, 
1944), the Arctic lost its position of importance in Russia’s state policy during perestroika and 
then in the following collapse of the USSR (Fenenko, 2012a). For more than 15 years after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders hardly paid any attention to the development of 
the national legal base regulating the exploration of the Arctic region (Zhukov, 2015). In the 
1990s, the Arctic was mentioned in the law-making process mainly as part of a broader political 
agenda. For instance, in 1997 Boris Yeltsin approved the Federal Target Programme ‘Global 
Ocean’ (1997). Section 9 of the Programme defines Russian national interests and priorities in 
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the Arctic. In 1998, the State Duma was presented with a draft of the Federal Law on the Arctic 
Territory of the Russian Federation (Zhukov, 2015). However, the law has never been approved 
and the Arctic region continued to be a largely absent issue in the Russian legislation until 
Medvedev approved the ‘Foundations of Russia’s Arctic policy’ (2008). Therefore, only in the 
2000s, the Arctic regained its political and economic value for Russia, which made the country 
one of the most important players in Arctic politics. It has also ‘refuelled’ the state’s desire to 
be seen as an ‘Arctic Great Power’ both domestically and internationally, leading Russia to use 
identity-building rhetoric as a way to frame the Arctic in Russian political discourse.  
 It should be noted that the Russian Arctic and sub-Arctic regions already produce 98% 
of Russia’s diamonds, 90% of its oil, gas, nickel, cobalt and platinum, 60% of its copper and 
24% of its gold – the extraction of which provides 11% of Russia’s GDP (Magomedov, 2013). 
Additionally, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) has the potential to halve the distance between 
the Far East and Europe, the Artic could also help to avoid the possible dangers arising from 
piracy (Blunden, 2012). The variations in the timing of ice melting and the absence of trade 
opportunities for ships on their way from Asia to Europe restrain the NSR’s development 
(Magomedov, 2013).   
Despite the benefits of the Arctic’s resources for Russia, there are challenges which might 
prevent the country from succeeding in the ‘race for the “treasures of the Arctic”’ (Morozov, 
2012: 24). Due to the Arctic’s severe climate conditions, the extraction of oil will become 
profitable only if the price of oil exceeds $100/barrel (Orttung, 2011: 8), which has become 
less likely in the current political context with global oil prices falling throughout 2014 and 
2015. Hence, it makes more sense for Russia to keep exploring its resources in other, more 
accessible areas.  
Another important topic is the question of international cooperation on Arctic-related 
issues. Some of Russia’s past decisions regarding the region have been seen as controversial. 
In August 2007, Russia planted a titanium flag on the Arctic seabed. This symbolic gesture 
provoked a wave of media attention and negative reaction from the international community: 
‘the dangerous mission prompted ridicule and scepticism among other contenders for the 
Arctic's energy wealth, with Canada comparing it to a 15th century colonial land grab’ (Parfitt, 
2007). However, the official aim of this approximately $60 million expedition was to carry out 
scientific research in order to support Russia’s application for extending its Arctic boundaries 
(Kefferputz, 2010). In a recent interview to foreign journalists Putin once again articulated the 
Russian position on the incident (RF 24/05/2014):  
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This was not a state action, it was rather an emotional action. I don’t see anything 
horrible in it. Americans landed on the moon and planted their flag. We are not 
arguing with them because they did it and don’t tell them that they claimed the 
moon.    
After the ‘flag’ incident, Russia turned towards a more cooperative policy by accepting 
bilateral and multilateral agreements with other Arctic nations (Orttung, 2011). Still Russian 
Arctic policy is often criticised in the Western media which focuses on Russia’s military 
activities, ultimately raising tension amongst the international community in a way that is 
reminiscent of the Cold War militarisation of the region (Wilson Rowe 2013). However, as 
Kefferputz (2010: 2) suggests, Russia’s ‘multi-dimensional’ approach to the Arctic reflects ‘not 
only the numerous different Russian interests in the region but also the influence of intangibles 
such as ideas and identity on Russian policy-making’. Indeed, Russia’s claims over the North 
have great support amongst the electorate and increase the popularity of politicians at all levels 
(ibid). The idea of Russia’s ‘Northerners’ and national pride of associating itself with the Arctic 
is also stated in the ‘Foundations of Russia’s Arctic policy’ (2008). The document claims that 
by 2020 the Arctic ought to become Russia’s leading strategic resource base, helping Russia to 
maintain its role of an ‘Arctic Great Power’. Laruelle (2011: 63) states that ‘in Russia, the 
conquest of the High North is an identity-building project’. Arguably, this could be a way to 
justify Russia’s claims to have priority rights to use the Arctic’s treasures.  
Based on this premise, the study explores how this ‘identity-building project’ is 
constructed in the official discourse in which Russian state leaders present their vision of the 
Arctic and its place in Russia’s state policy (foreign and domestic). It also aims to understand 
what the important components of the Russian Artic policy are and how they are articulated to 
the national and international audiences.   
Methodological considerations 
Discourse analysis allows us to de-construct the ‘national-identity narratives’ (De Cillia et al. 
1999: 152) and to understand how the states (in our case the Russian state) frame the Arctic 
and how through the use of certain linguistic tools state leaders create a narrative of Russian 
‘Arcticness’ (Medby, 2014: 253).  
Here, discourse is seen as a representation of political and social interactions (Fairclough, 
2001: 122), whilst discourse analysis looks at the language as an embodiment of the ‘linguistic 
conceptualization of the world’ (Fairclough et al., 2011: 358). Realising the complexity and 
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diversity of discourse analysis as a theory and methodology, this study is based on one 
particular approach – political discourse analysis (PDA) which ‘focuses on the reproduction 
and contestation of political power through political discourse’ (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 
17). It should be noted that the ‘political’ attribute of discourse in this case is understood as 
‘attached to political actors’ (ibid), where the ‘forms of text and talk have political functions 
and implications’ (van Dijk, 1997: 14). Jensen and Skedsmo (2010: 441) argue that the Russian 
government’s ‘white papers’ ‘both have and generate power by being perceived as relevant and 
important enough to participate and take centre stage in such important discourses’. Therefore, 
the texts produced on behalf of the President of Russia are perceived as representations of 
discourse shaping the nature of the state’s Arctic policy for it to be supported by the Russian 
audience.  
PDA allows us to critically assess the ‘tools’ used by Russian officials in their linguistic 
conceptualisation of the Arctic. For instance, Russian leaders in their speeches refer to a broad 
range of symbolic images to justify Russia’s policy in the region. One of the important 
narratives applied is Russia’s historical and geographical presence in the Arctic. This assertion 
is arguably based partly on Russia’s extensive Arctic coast and partly on the collective memory 
of Soviet propaganda regarding ‘Red Arctic’ (Laruelle, 2014: 27, McCannon 1998). As is 
demonstrated below, these widely recognized images are used to justify exclusive Russian 
rights to the economic benefits of Arctic exploration.  
Overall, in order to understand the ways in which the Arctic is conceptualised and 
positioned in the rhetoric of the Russian government, this article analyses texts from the 
President of Russia’s official website (www.kremlin.ru) which publishes the President’s 
official speeches, interviews, statements, transcripts of meetings and so on. The audience in 
this case is multifaceted as the documents are addressed to indigenous people, Russian and 
international journalists, diplomats, policy makers, leaders of other states, scientists and the 
general public. Furthermore, taking into consideration that the texts are openly available 
through the internet, the boundaries of the audience become even more obscure. Even though 
the role of the audience in the process of linguistic conceptualisation of the region is very 
important, for the purpose of this paper  we are concentrating specifically on the rhetorical and 
symbolic means used by the ‘speakers’ to gain the acceptance of this varying audience.  
The search was restricted to a seven-year timeframe (June 2008 - May 2015), totalling 
109 publications that mention ‘Arctic’ (the keywords ‘Arktika’ and ‘Arkticheskiy’ were applied 
in all their possible grammatical variations). The selected timeframe demonstrates the most 
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recent developments in Russian Arctic policy and, at the same time, provides an interesting 
comparison between Medvedev’s orientation towards a policy of modernisation and 
international dialogue, and Putin’s nationalistic approach which mostly relies on the defence 
of national interests and promotion of the country’s political and economic independence 
(Sakwa 2014). As discussed above, since the mid-2000s Russian Arctic policy has revived – 
after a temporary decline in the 1990s (McCannon 2012), and it is during this time that the 
region has successfully re-entered the official Russian discourse. The potential limitations of 
the restricted timeframe have been mitigated by reviewing the relevant pre-2008 legislative 
documents.  
Figure 1 demonstrates that the majority of the presidential texts are evenly distributed 
over the studied period, however, 2014 significantly stands out with 41 publications. This 
‘abnormality’ coincided with the major political and economic changes in Russia provoked by 
the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, which signifies a special role of the Arctic in Russian 
foreign and domestic politics.       
Figure 1. Overall number of analysed texts. 
 
The analytical guideline for processing the collected data was adapted from Siegfried 
Jager (2001: 55) with some adjustments to the analysis of the Russian Arctic policy represented 
within the official discourse. Each text/article was manually coded. In order to diminish errors 
and achieve greater reliability of the results, all data was double-coded. The analysis includes 
the following stages. Firstly, we identified the ‘institutional framework’, the reason the 
document was produced (e.g. a speech at an international summit) which subsequently 
influenced the purpose of the text. The text’s ‘surface’ has allowed us to look at its structural 
components: headlines, the sequence of the paragraphs, the introduction of various themes, and 
how the Artic enters the discussion – for example, as a main subject of the statement or as one 
political issues mentioned among others and, therefore, its importance has to be considered 
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within these structural constraints. The analysis of the rhetorical means showed how the 
meaning was constructed through linguistic means – use of metaphors, re-emphasis of specific 
vocabulary, argumentation strategies (e.g. repetitive use of the concept of ‘Russian 
Arcticness’). The ‘ideological statement’ category identified how each document reflected 
Russia’s position towards the Arctic (e.g. a natural right to execute ownership over the region). 
Finally, based on the analysis of all these elements, each document has been localised within 
the broader discourse strand (‘flows of discourse that centre on a common topic’ (Jager & 
Maier, 2009: 46)). Based on the conducted analysis and identified semantic and notional 
commonalities within the studied body of texts, five strands were identified: ‘international 
dialogue’, ‘environmental protection’, ‘an Arctic state’, ‘national security’ and ‘economic 
development’. Table 1 provides examples of how each stage of the coding process allowed us 
to locate the text within a certain category.  
Table 1. Discursive categories with the examples  
 Institutional 
framework 
Text ‘surface’ Rhetorical means Ideological 
statements 
International 
Dialogue      
Meeting 
with foreign 
officials 
One of the 
items of 
discussions 
‘it is not a politics of 
“racing” but a policy 
of cooperation’ 
Cooperation 
stimulates Arctic 
development 
Environmental 
Protection 
Meeting 
with 
scientists 
One of the 
items of 
discussion 
‘unique Arctic nature’ 
 
Russia is heavily 
involved in 
cleaning the Arctic 
Arctic State Meeting 
with 
veterans 
 
No obvious 
relation to the 
theme of the 
document 
‘We should be 
recognised as an 
Arctic superpower, the 
state which is not 
there by chance, but 
by right’ 
The Arctic is an 
integral part of the 
Russian political, 
economic and 
social realm 
Economic 
Development 
Opening 
speech 
(business 
summit) 
One of the 
central issues 
discussed 
‘our most important 
goal is to turn the 
Arctic into a Russian 
resource base of the 
21st century’ 
Russia’s inherent 
right to the 
resources which 
are central to its 
economic 
development 
National 
Security 
Security 
Council 
meeting 
Appears next 
to the 
Ukrainian 
conflict 
‘in Arctic all aspects 
of national security 
concentrate’ 
Russia is not 
militarising the 
region, but 
protecting its 
national interests 
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It should be noted that the same text falls into various categories if it contains more than 
one of the ‘discourse fragments’ (Jager & Maier, 2009: 47). Furthermore, each category is not 
homogeneous and, in some cases, it can contain texts with contradictory messages. For 
example, the ‘environmental protection’ strand might include both texts promoting Arctic 
environmental conservation and neglecting it.  
Analysis 
The redistribution of the identified discursive categories (Figure 2) shows how framing of the 
Arctic in the Russian political discourse has been altered over the years. Evidently, some 
categories such as ‘international dialogue’ and, especially, ‘economic development’ 
consistently take the lead, whilst others such as ‘national security’ or ‘environmental 
protection’ appear more sporadically depending on the political or economic context. The 
analysis of the reviewed sample did not determine any significant variation in distribution of 
the discursive categories during the presidencies of Medvedev and Putin. 
Figure 2. Number of the discursive categories over the years.  
 
The close study of the texts has allowed us to analyse the role and significance of each category 
as well as to discuss the possible reasons for these patterns.         
An Arctic State 
In total, 37% of the documents (N=39) contain references to Russia as an Arctic state (see 
figure 2). These documents focus on such subjects as the scientific development of the Arctic, 
culture and the lifestyle of the ethnic groups living in the Arctic, and the ‘Russian national 
idea’. The corpus develops the argument of Russia’s ‘Arcticness’ (Medby, 2014: 253) which 
further evolves into an even greater concept of Russia being an Arctic Great Power: ‘we are a 
natural Arctic state’, (RF 28/11/2011); ‘the Arctic is our region, our coastal lines and maritime 
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spaces’ (RF 11/11/2011). Arguably, presenting the country as the epitome of an Arctic state 
provides justification for Russian policy in the region: at the national level, reproducing Arctic 
identity; whilst at the international level, justifying assertive actions.  
There are two central themes in this discursive category: geographical location, and 
social and cultural factors. Both factors have strong symbolic power and are widely recognised 
and supported by the Russian population (FOM 2015). Firstly, Russian Arctic territory is not 
restricted by the Arctic circle, but includes greater territories originally defined by the Soviet 
government in 1926 and re-defined in 2014 in a Presidential Decree (N296, 2/05/2014). 
Secondly, some of the documents aim to demonstrate that the Arctic region is deeply integrated 
into Russian culture and society. 
 The Arctic region is framed ‘as a Russian national territory and not an “ethno-region”’ 
(Laruelle, 2014: 39). The region is mentioned in relation to a number of cultural events 
celebrating ethnic groups living in the Arctic region (RF 24/08/2012). For example, the need 
to support reindeer farming which is ‘a significant part of life for a large number of our people’ 
(RF 18/05/2011). The indigenous people blame major extracting companies (Gazprom, Norilsk 
Nickel) for pasture degradation (Laruelle, 2014: 39). In the 2000s, the Kremlin has tried to act 
as a defender of local population, and to promote the possibility of the coexistence of 
indigenous trades and the industrial production in the region. Overall, the culture and lifestyle 
of the indigenous people of the Arctic region are presented as an integral part of Russian 
society, but not as a core, defining element of the Russian Arctic, therefore, it does not alienate 
the rest of the population which do not belong to an ethnic Arctic minority. 
The belief in Russia’s ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ also comes from the conviction that only 
this country has the necessary experience and knowledge to contribute to the economic and 
social development of the region and to the protection of its ecosystem. For example, Russia’s 
leading role in the scientific exploration of the Arctic is emphasised (RF 8/05/2011). By 
highlighting how Russian people of different professional backgrounds, age and gender are 
involved in the exploration of the Arctic (e.g. RF 8/05/2011; RF 25/05/2013) the political 
narrative helps to present the remote region as an integral part of Russia. This in turn provides 
a justification (in the opinion of Russian state leaders) for ensuring that other countries 
interested in the exploration of the Arctic should ‘coordinate their actions with Russian national 
interests’ (RF 28/11/2011). 
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Overall, the analysed texts illustrate how Russian leaders use references to historical 
and cultural presence in the region as an identity-building mechanism which allows them to 
justify proactive (often resource-demanding) Arctic policies. Political leaders, emphasising the 
key role of the Arctic in Russian political, economic and cultural life, define Russia's priorities 
in the region and establish the borderlines between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the Arctic where ‘them’ 
can be presented by either the other states or, as discussed below, by the previous Russian state 
formations. By establishing the Russian ‘Arcticness’, speakers do not leave the option of not 
getting involved in Arctic politics since ‘Russia is the Arctic’. The claim is based on Russia’s 
‘current and historic presence in the Arctic’ (RF 12/12/2012); the fact that it has the longest 
Arctic coastline and Russia’s continuous contribution to the economic, environmental and 
scientific development of the Arctic.   
Environmental Protection  
The discursive category of ‘environmental protection’ was identified in 33% of the texts 
(N=36) (see Figure 2) which predominately concentrate on issues of environmental pollution 
of the Russian Arctic used for fossil fuel extraction or nuclear waste disposal and storage. The 
Arctic is often referred to as a unique and fragile ecosystem (RF 9/06/2011), which has to be 
treated with caution. Emphasis is made on the financial help provided by the state for the 
clearing operations (with almost 2.5 billion roubles allocated from the federal budget for 2012, 
2013 and 2014) (RF 30/07/2012) or other government’s environmental initiatives (e.g. giving 
a part of Russian Arctic the status of a national park). One can be sceptical of how effective 
these measures are, but as Ebinger and Zambetakis (2009: 1229) note they can ‘signal that 
Russia apparently believes it has more to gain by following international law and demonstrating 
ecological sensitivity than by aggressively asserting its sovereignty’.  
 In some instances, anxiety over the Arctic’s environmental degradation coincides with 
Russia’s economic interest where ‘sustainable development of the region’ becomes of high 
importance (RF 6/08/2011, RF 22/01/2013). The environment is also discussed within the 
context of international cooperation with Russia either helping the international community in 
‘preserving the unique nature of the Arctic’ (RF 7/08/2011) or emphasising the necessity of 
international support in environmental solutions (RF 9/06/2011).  
One of the striking issues concerning this category is the frequent use of the dichotomy 
‘we-they’, where ‘they’ are ‘previous generations’ which have polluted the Arctic, whilst ‘we’ 
is a modern Russian state (e.g. RF 30/07/2012) which ‘inherited’ all these problems from the 
 13 
 
USSR. Interestingly, in this case ‘we’ does not just refer to the national ‘we’ of Russians, as an 
opposition to everyone who is ‘non-Russian’; instead ‘we’ makes a distinction between 
different historical periods of the same state (which technically can include the same people). 
As Petersoo argues, ‘what does ‘we’ really mean in any particular case remains open for 
speculation and interpretation, and whether the ‘we’ always perform a nationalising role is also 
questionable’ (2007: 433). Wodak (2012: 216) writes that rhetorical means are used to shape 
group identity and define similarities and differences between ‘us’ and ‘others’, or identity 
construction through exclusion. We identified two examples of ‘the other’ in the selected 
sample of texts. Boundaries are drawn between the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union, 
and between Russia and the other Arctic states. In the first case, previous generations are 
blamed for endangering the vulnerable environment of the Arctic region, then modern Russia 
is presented as a ‘protector of the environment’. In the second case, the texts illustrate the 
instrumental use of identity-centred rhetoric to underline again the message that the ‘Arctic is 
Russia’ (and vice versa) which does not leave any room for doubt about involvement into 
Arctic politics, thus any economic or human resources invested in the region are justified.  
The Arctic was named a ‘climate change hot spot’ (Anisimov & Reneva, 2006: 169), the 
consequences of which might bring tragic outcomes for the Earth’s ecosystem (Ebinger & 
Zambetakis, 2009). However, within the studied texts, climate change was mentioned only in 
five of them. One of the texts is a transcript of a Russian Security Council meeting on climate 
change (RF 17/03/2010), during which the Arctic is mentioned as an example of how climate 
change can lead to international confrontations. It could be argued that in this case Russian 
leaders use climate change rhetoric to define Russia's role in the broader Arctic region, and 
again to draw on differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (the other Arctic states).   
The limited discussion of climate change can be explained by Russia’s overall somewhat 
questionable climate policy, which is often defined by the state’s economic agenda and political 
interests (Andonova, 2008; Korppoo & Vatansever, 2012). Instead, concentrating on Russia’s 
policy of cleaning the Arctic from ‘inherited’ waste, environmental discourse in this case 
contributes to the creation of the new state identity, which cannot be blamed for the previous 
mischief of the USSR. Interestingly, if we compare the ‘Arctic state’ and the ‘environmental 
protection’ categories, we can observe how the historical references in the identity-building 
strategies can be used in different ways, by either emphasising deep historical connections with 
the region or underlining the new era of Russian policy in the Arctic. The cleaning operations 
do not only find vast support among the Russian people, national media and even academic 
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community (Lukin 2013), but, it can also be argued that, by ‘cleaning its premises’, Russia 
exercises its ownership over the Arctic without causing confrontation with the international 
community.   
International dialogue      
This discursive category includes 31% of texts (N=34) which discuss the Arctic in the context 
of international cooperation or, on the contrary, in the context of Russia’s unwillingness to 
allow anyone else to be involved (Figure 2). In the majority of cases, the ‘institutional 
framework’ for the texts became meetings between the Russian President and leaders of other 
states (predominately members of the Arctic Council). The Arctic is frequently called a 
‘priority direction’ (RF 1/08/2012) in cooperation between respective countries, which will 
contribute to a ‘single economic space in the Arctic’ (RF 30/11/2010).  
There are a number of texts devoted to the maritime delimitation treaty2 between Russia 
and Norway on settling boundaries in the Barents Sea (e.g. RF 10/02/2011; 27/04/2010). 
Several months before the agreement was officially signed, then Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev (RF 27/04/2010) stated that ‘boundaries have to be settled so the resources can be 
accessed’ and that ‘it is not a politics of “racing” but a policy of cooperation in order to achieve 
common goals’. Despite this positive discourse, the outcome of the agreement was not 
supported and was even criticised in Russia3 due to the way it supposedly contradicted Russian 
interests (Poval, 2012). In this case, the opinion of the national audience was sacrificed to 
‘strategic benefits’, which made Norway accept Russian Arctic borders and ‘reduced the risk 
of interaction between Oslo, Ottawa and Washington on an anti-Russian basis’ (Fenenko, 
2012a).  
Interestingly, in some cases, the ambiguous situation of the Arctic’s status in international 
relations is also mentioned through comparison of the Arctic with other ‘sensitive issues’ such 
as Afghanistan (RF 23/03/2012) suggesting that it is either an equally important or equally 
sensitive and difficult item of international security. Besides, in some cases the ‘dialogue’ 
comes down to confrontation and the protection of Russian national interests (RF 17/03/2010). 
                                                          
2 The history of the Russian-Norwegian border dispute has stretched over decades (official re-
negotiations started in 1970) (Poval, 2012). 
3 During the ratification of the agreement, 57 (out of 368) members of the Russian lower 
chamber of the parliament (the Duma) voted against it. These were mostly opposition parties 
who were concerned with why Russia should give up its territories and its resources – ‘it is 
not like we lost the war’ (Lukin 2012: 400).   
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It is clear that Russia takes a firm stance on its own ‘sovereignty and legitimacy’ in the region 
(this issue will be elaborated on in the next sub-section). Therefore, this links us back to the 
idea of the Arctic as a natural Russian state.  
The discursive category of ‘international dialogue’ is interesting in a sense that it mostly 
demonstrates Russia’s cooperative attitude towards the Arctic (at least in the official discourse). 
This supports the argument of Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud (2014: 67) who state that ‘the 
Arctic […] is well-established in Russian political discourse and foreign policy practice as an 
international relations “zone”’. Even though the degree of cooperation and collaboration with 
other states could be disputed, but as Dodds (2010: 71) points out with regards to the Ilulissat 
Declaration acceptance, ‘the use of words such as “we” is highly significant in expressing a 
form of geo-power’. This statement could be applied to the discussed situation – it is ‘highly 
significant’ that Russia shares ownership of the Arctic with other states, and both Presidents 
Putin and Medvedev frequently suggested a policy of cooperation, rather than confrontation in 
the region.  
This unfolds the following dilemma in Russian Arctic policy where for the national 
audience the official discourse paints a picture of the assertive Russian Arctic policy. Whilst 
for the international community (without which the economic development of the region 
becomes extremely complicated) the narrative revolves around the ideas of cooperation and 
legal ways of resolving any disputes. This ‘dilemma’ could be explained by the clash between 
the state’s (mostly economic) needs and the public opinion (which was evident during the 
signing of the delimitation treaty with Norway) and could be attributed to the failure of the 
political discourse’s ability to manage both audiences.     
‘National Security’ 
Until the start of 2014 national security did not receive a lot of attention in the analysed sample 
of texts where only a few speeches mentioned the ‘danger of the militarization of the Arctic’ 
(RF 27/02/2013). However, since 2014 national security and Arctic militarisation became more 
prominent in Russian official discourse (Figure 2). During a Security Council meeting 
President Putin underlined that ‘here [in the Arctic] all aspects of national security concentrate: 
military-political, economic, technological, environmental and resource ones’ (RF 
22/04/2014), therefore, it is important to ensure the protection of Russian Arctic borders. The 
last point is also mentioned in the context of the unstable international situation with ‘some 
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countries’4 pursuing the offensive policy of ‘unrestricted pre-emptive actions’, as a result ‘the 
chance of conflicts increases in the strategically important regions for Russia’ (RF 9/04/2015).  
This coincided with the increasing Russian military presence in the Artic. For example 
in 2014 Russia announced its intention to strengthen air defence in the region (RIA Novosti, 
2014). In the same year, a battalion of 350 Russian paratroopers carried out a practice landing 
on the New Siberian Islands (ITAR-TASS, 2014) which was followed by a convoy of ships 
sent to these islands in order to re-open Russia’s military base. Russia is not unique in this 
policy of Arctic militarisation (Konyshev & Sergunin 2012) and there are different opinions 
on the nature of increased Russian military presence in the region. It has received 
predominantly critical/negative coverage in foreign media (Redpath 2014). In contrast, national 
media supported the official discourse that re-building military infrastructure in the Artic is not 
an offensive move, but to ensure the security of the NSR for everyone (Egorov 2014). This 
observation supports Keil’s (2014: 170) argument, that the main target audience of this 
‘military muscle-stretching’ is the Russian public, rather than the international community. It 
can be interpreted as part of ‘Russia's plan to return to great-power status’ (ibid: 169), at least 
in its own eyes.  
State officials in their speeches stress that it is not a ‘militarisation’ of the Arctic as such 
but the protection of national interests. The contradictory idea of a non-militarised 
securitisation of the Russian Arctic surfaces throughout various texts. For example, in his 
conversation with Russian students, Putin re-enforces the official justification of the earlier 
mentioned landing of the Russian paratroopers in the Arctic (RF 19/12/2014):  
Recently, the landing of the military paratroopers took place – peaceful, but a 
military one. It is our territory, we will be reviving there all this military 
infrastructure, infrastructure of the MCHS [Ministry of Emergency] because we 
need to provide secure passages for convoys of ships and trading routes, and not for 
the sake of engaging in a war with someone or start a conflict.              
These discursive changes have coincided with the development of the conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine. Interestingly, the Arctic and Crimea sometimes are mentioned in the same statements 
as one of the priorities in Russia’s national security (e.g. RF 19/11/2014). Similarly, Russian 
                                                          
4 It could be suggested that the President was referring to the USA and its allies (who 
according to the official Russian position are in charge of steering troubles in various 
countries and particularly in Ukraine).  
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officials stress that despite any accusations Russia is not going to engage in an open conflict, 
so the changes in its Northern frontier should be treated just as a ‘flexing of muscles’. If in the 
Ukrainian conflict this explanation is widely disputed (with some suggesting Russia’s active 
military involvement), in the Arctic case due to the gap in capabilities and very different 
national agendas it might make more sense for the interested parties. The ‘non-militarising 
securitisation’ of the Russian Arctic is important not so much to its actual security but to its 
identity as a strong state (especially, during a period of political and economic sanctions) 
targeting people inside the country.  
 Golts (2011: 59) states that even though the Arctic is a space where the interests of 
former rivals (Russia and the USA) ‘clash’, the disputes can only re-create the ‘parody of cold 
war’. Dittmer et al. (2011: 205) point out that the geographical characteristics of the far north 
contributes to the ‘relatively little chance of actual combat’ between the states, despite 
disagreements over territorial claims. From the Russian perspective, the desire to avoid an open 
conflict can be explained not only by shortcomings in the state’s military resources (Kovalev 
& Gainutdinova 2012), but mostly through the need for cooperation in the Arctic, where 
exploration requires foreign technologies, investment and access to export markets (Gorenburg 
2011).Therefore, the international audience should perceive this discourse of securitisation 
with scepticism, considering how extremely limited the chance of a real threat coming from 
the country in the region is. 
Economic Development 
This category is perhaps the most important in terms of the protection of Russian interests and 
it proved to be the most popular one with over 50% of the analysed texts (N=55) referring to it 
(Figure 2). The category can be divided into two overlapping subtopics: the NSR and the Arctic 
as the resource base.  
The texts continuously describe the Arctic’s ‘strategic importance’ to stress the role of 
the region in the Russian economy (e.g. RF 14/04/2010, RF 21/05/2013). The commercially 
viable maritime routes can link Russian mining industries with major international markets 
(Blunden, 2012). Therefore, it is only logical that some texts urge Russia’s active participation 
in the development of the NSR to ensure and strengthen its position in the Arctic (e.g. RF 
11/11/2011).  The ‘strategic importance’ is also connected with Russia’s energy security where 
the Arctic is seen as ‘a Russian resource base of the 21st century’ (RF 17/09/2008).  
The importance of the Arctic for the Russian economy is reflected in the Russian 
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legislation (Russian government, 2009: 78). This is not surprising considering that, according 
to estimates, ‘25% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves could lie under the Arctic 
Ocean’ (Smith & Gilles, 2007: 1), and Russia controls territory potentially containing 8.2 
billion barrels of oil and gas reserves (Bahgat, 2010: 16). The gas reserves are especially 
important for the future of the Russian energy sector. It is estimated that the share of natural 
gas in the global energy mix will increase from 21% to 24% by 2040 (Guliyev and Ruzakova, 
2015: 80) and Russia plans to retain its position as one of the key players on the international 
hydrocarbon markets (Russian government, 2009: 22). The climate specifications of the region 
can slow down the development of the energy resources in the Russian Arctic. In addition, 
Russia lacks the necessary technology for the deep-water drilling necessary in the Arctic 
(Fenenko, 2012b). This factor is significantly underestimated, if not misrepresented in the 
analysed texts.  
On a number of occasions, the texts refer to what is presented as the ‘unique’ experience 
and skills of Russian energy companies working on the exploration of Arctic resources (RF 
21/05/2013, RF 21/06/2013). These texts mainly refer to the oil and gas fields already 
discovered in the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas, and in the Timan-Pechora basin (Bahgat, 
2010: 170). It is underlined that only Russian companies can fulfil these ‘projects’ (RF 
23/05/2014). In reality, some of the mentioned projects (including the exploration of the new 
supergiant Shtokhman field in the Barents Sea) faced major technological and investment 
setbacks in the last couple of years (Kapyla & Mikkola, 2013). Russia struggled with acquiring 
the necessary technology and expertise for efficient exploration of energy reserves in the 
extreme climate conditions (Bahgat, 2010). The economic sanctions imposed on Russia have 
worsened the situation. That forced Western energy companies to limit their participation in 
the new exploration projects (Rutland, 2014). Additionally, the sanctions limited the ability of 
Russian energy companies to get international loans (Shirov et al., 2015). Altogether, the 
Russian economy could lose up to $15 billion a year due to the disruption of economic ties 
between Russia and the West in the energy sector (Ibid). Despite Russian attempts to find new 
partners capable of assisting Russian companies with offshore deep water drilling operations, 
the sanctions ‘could cause a 25% drop in Russian output by 2025’ (Rutland, 2014: 5).  
This difference between the ‘real’ turn of events and their representation by the Russian 
leaders can be explained by their attempts to support the image of Russia as a ‘strong’ Arctic 
player mostly for the domestic audience. Russian political discourse should emphasise the 
importance of balancing between competition and cooperation in the Russian Arctic (Wilson 
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Rowe 2012) since this is important for gaining public support for the international cooperation 
in the region. This category explains to the national audience why the exploration of the Arctic 
is worthwhile and why the current efforts will bring long-term benefits. In this case, identity-
building tools are applied in order to achieve further tangible gains.   
In 2014 when Russia, with its specific position in the Ukrainian conflict, entered the 
shaky ground of becoming an international antagonist, references to ‘economic development’ 
peaked and far surpassed all other categories (including the national security one). It seems 
quite natural that in times of economic sanction the state has turned its head to the new avenues 
of potential economic stability. But, it is also important to note that in front of the international 
audience (for example, during meetings with the foreign leaders or journalists) economic 
development in the Arctic is often mentioned in the context of international cooperation where 
even the delimitation agreement with Norway is seen as a contribution to future prosperity. 
This makes the idea of an open military conflict in the Arctic even more unlikely, despite the 
fact that for the Russian audience the state’s full capacity to develop the Arctic on its own terms 
is consistently underlined.    
Conclusion 
Dittmer et al. (2011: 205) argue that ‘it is not just the Arctic’s climate that is changing […], 
but rather that the region is being reconstituted within a discursive formation’. As recent news 
show (RIA Novosti, 2015; Zykova, 2014) the Arctic remains an important item on the Russian 
political agenda and it is very likely that its prominence will only increase over time as the 
economic recession stimulates greater interest in the region. At the same time, the forceful 
national discourse on positioning itself as the ‘Arctic Great Power’ correlates with strong public 
support (FOM 2015) for a more assertive Arctic policy. We conclude that for Russia the 
establishing the homogeneous identity of an ‘Arctic state’ is important for ensuring a leading 
place in competition for the Arctic's exploration (King Ruel, 2011).  
De Cillia et al. (1999: 154) note that ‘the construction of national identity builds on the 
emphasis of a common history’. Indeed, the conducted analysis demonstrates that Russian 
leaders emphasise the historical connection between Russia and the Arctic and, in fact, position 
the state as a ‘historical’ Arctic Great Power. At the same time, it has been observed that 
identity is not constant and it can evolve depending on political context and other interests 
(Wodak, 2012: 217). For instance, within the studied data the traditional military dimension of 
the Arctic was hardly mentioned until 2014. The change coincides with the current Ukrainian 
 20 
 
crisis and the state’s subsequent diminished status in international affairs, which was followed 
by a series of sanctions and exclusions from major international organisations. The impact of 
external factors over Russian Arctic policy was also evident in the discursive categories of 
‘international dialogue’ and ‘economic development’, where the political and economic 
restrictions or motivations have swayed Russia towards the policy of ‘forced diplomacy’ in the 
region.  
Russian leaders need to not only communicate the ‘uniqueness’ of Russia as compared 
to other Arctic states, but also the significance of the Arctic to the national audience. Here, 
Russia faces similar problems to other Arctic states.5 The Russian Arctic is scarcely populated 
and stretches across multiple federal districts and it is not enough to claim that ‘the Arctic is 
Russian’ when the region is ‘undervalued in […] social, economic, and demographic respects’ 
(Laruelle, 2014: 31). The exploration of the Arctic is greatly centralised, with the main focus 
being placed on natural resources. At the same time, the indigenous people have little control 
over the activities of the energy companies in the Arctic region (Steinberg et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, indigenous people and people in the non-Arctic parts of Russia are often 
separated both geographically and culturally. The narrative created by the state should create 
the feeling of belonging to the Arctic across the country, and the feeling of belonging to Russia 
among the indigenous populations of the circumpolar regions.  
Therefore, discourse around ‘Russian Arcticness’ is also influenced by internal processes 
whereby Russian leaders use multidimensional framing to present the country as a strong 
powerful state and the Arctic as a ‘natural’ component of its national identity, which does not 
leave any room for the domestic audience to start questioning the rationale of its Arctic policy. 
There is also a continuity in Russian political discourse where the fluctuation in distribution of 
the texts between discursive categories is insignificant to build strong conclusions about 
differences in the priorities of Putin’s and Medvedev’s administrations.  
It is also apparent that the discursive construction of the region does not always 
correspond to the reality of events. In particular, the Russian political discourse aimed at the 
domestic audience does not necessarily reflect the state’s actual economic and foreign policies 
in the region. Thus, the identity-building narrative does not entirely incorporate the benefits of 
international cooperation, but highlights the differences between ‘us’ (a natural Arctic state) 
                                                          
5 State leader of both the USA and Denmark have to negotiate the place of their Arctic 
territories (Greenland and Alaska) to the residents of the non-Arctic regions (Steinberg et al. 
2015: 105). 
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and ‘them’ (other Arctic states). In the long-term, it would be important to correct this 
omission, considering the prominence of international cooperation for the economic 
development of the Russian Arctic. As the analysis of Russia’s economic and military 
capabilities shows, it needs to cooperate with other states, as demonstrated through its 
willingness to follow international norms and regulations with regards to the region. At the 
same time, the international community (if it would like to try to work with this important but 
often difficult political actor) should ignore Russia’s ostentatious demonstration of power and 
try to find common ground in their discourses.  
Whilst this paper serves as a solid foundation for developing our understanding of state 
discourse on Russia’s Arctic policy, some important themes were not within the scope of this 
analysis. These limitations should be considered in future studies. Firstly, state rhetoric cannot 
be equated with actual governmental policies, because there is an observed gap between the 
image portrayed and the state’s capabilities. Secondly, even though this research revealed 
continuity in Russia’s Arctic policy, the findings are constrained by the seven-year timeframe. 
National identity is context-dependent and constantly evolving. Collecting data beyond this 
time limit would allow us to identify long-term trends in the political discourse. Lastly, future 
research inquiries should aim to approach a more diverse range of data allowing us to see how 
Russia’s discourse is perceived and interpreted by a range of external actors.  
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